Between the explicit threats made by Iran through official media outlets about the imminent punishment of Israel in retaliation for the killing of Ismail Haniyeh inside a military guesthouse in Tehran, and the subsequent retraction of these threats, a clear wavering in the intensity of the mutual Iranian and Israeli statements about the impending strike on Tel Aviv reflects a state of confusion and fear within both leaderships of slipping into an open war that is not in the interests of either Iran, Israel, or their backers.

As the New York Times announced, Netanyahu has become uncontrollable by the U.S. and has sidelined Joseph Biden after their recent meeting, where he did not inform Biden of Israel's plans to assassinate Iranian-affiliated leaders including Ismail Haniyeh and Fouad Shakar, as well as provoking Iran with the timing of announcing the death of Mohammed Deif concurrently with Haniyeh's assassination. This Israeli message implies that Netanyahu will assassinate an Iranian leader every half hour and that he is not afraid of war on all fronts. He ignores the involvement of other parties in the Israeli-Iranian conflict, with Russia declaring that it will arm the Houthis if Israel enters an open war with Iran, and Putin supplying the Houthis with advanced radar systems enabling them to accurately target several Israeli ships in the Red Sea and thwart Israeli attacks. Additionally, North Korea has announced that it will supply Iran with nuclear weapons if Israel launches nuclear attacks on South Lebanon or Iran. This necessitates examining the potential scenarios of the anticipated Iranian strike on Israel and the possible subsequent reactions.

 Military Reinforcements Before the Iranian Strike

As a researcher on Iranian affairs, I have previously reviewed several reports in military journals indicating a deficiency in Iran's stockpile of missile launchers. Russia has recently covered this shortfall by sending a shipment of missile launchers to Tehran to support it in its war against Israel. Additionally, it has provided the Houthi faction affiliated with Iran in Yemen with advanced radar systems, which have recently enabled them to avoid Israeli attacks and facilitate the operation of Houthi drone boats loaded with explosives, which have accurately targeted several Israeli ships in the Red Sea due to the advanced Russian radar systems. On the other hand, this does not negate the U.S. supplying Israel with modern air defense systems, recently announced and accompanied by many technicians and professional soldiers to activate them, thereby increasing the number of American soldiers in the region. Moreover, it has announced the delivery of a large shipment of American MK83 bombs to Tel Aviv to respond to Iran if it causes significant damage in the Israeli interior, warranting retaliation. This represents the third American military reinforcement in the region with soldiers and weapons. This is one of the significant services Iran has provided to the U.S. by bringing the latter back to the region after its withdrawal and imposing extensive American military reinforcements under the guise of creating a Western coalition led by the densely present U.S. in the region to counter Iranian attacks and protect Tel Aviv. Iran has also benefited from Russian arms deals.

Scenario of Delaying the Strike to Cause Attrition

The delay in the Iranian strike on Israel in retaliation for Haniyeh’s assassination has led us, through analyzing the situation, to expect several possible scenarios for the delay. The first is Iran’s intention to exhaust, confuse, and distract Israel militarily, economically, and security-wise. This prompted Tel Aviv to announce for the first time through the Times of Israel the number of Israeli casualties since October 7, reaching 10,000, a significant number adding to the 3% drop in the Israeli stock market in recent days due to the tense security situation in Israel and the uncertainty about the timing of the Iranian strike in retaliation for Haniyeh. This has led to a doubling of the flight of capital and companies from the Israeli market compared to the situation after the Al-Aqsa Flood attacks. Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper reported that Prime Minister Netanyahu was the first to descend into the underground bunker below the Israeli Ministry of Defense in a state of fear and anticipation of the imminent Iranian strike, which led the Israeli government to take several measures in recent days, raising its readiness to receive approximately 200,000 rockets loaded with explosives, which is Hezbollah's stockpile of medium and short-range ballistic missiles. It has also distributed satellite phones to Israeli ministers in anticipation of a nationwide power outage in Israel. The scenario of delaying the Iranian strike might also aim to provoke Israel into launching a preemptive strike, igniting the spark of war. It can be said that Iran has begun its military distraction and diversion for Israel and the U.S. by striking the Ayn al-Asad base in Iraq, causing damage, simultaneously with targeting the Israeli city of Eliat and resulting in dozens of casualties.

Scenario of Consecutive Strikes from Multiple Fronts

This scenario is the nightmare that worries Israel about the possibility of receiving a wave of Iranian strikes, not just a single isolated strike, from all Iranian fronts simultaneously. By following the strategy of diversion and distraction for the Israeli Iron Dome system, Hezbollah could direct strikes at the Iron Dome to occupy it, while other Iranian fronts, including the Revolutionary Guard, prepare to strike Israel, causing massive damage. However, I rule out this scenario because it would lead to an all-out war that neither Israel nor Iran seeks. I strongly believe that the scenario of open war depends on the extent of the losses Israel would incur from Iranian strikes. If the losses are limited, like those in April following Israel's targeting of the Iranian consulate in Damascus and Iran's subsequent limited retaliatory strikes to save face, then the scenario might not escalate. However, the anticipated Iranian strike on Israel cannot be compared to those in April due to Iran's critical situation after the collapse of its military image and the state of anger and fear among Iranian citizens following the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh inside Iranian territory and the regime’s need to restore its image before its militias and followers and to project that the regime still retains its prestige and strength.

This is the worst-case scenario for Tel Aviv, especially since Israel's weakness lies in fighting multiple open-front wars. It is enough to recall that Israel, over a year of the Al-Aqsa Flood, failed to win a single-front war and could only eliminate 30% of Hamas's military capabilities and destroy approximately 25% of the tunnels. How will Israel face wars on five fronts where Iran responds both directly and through proxies, especially since Netanyahu knows well that his air defense system won’t withstand a prolonged war, which might last days? The same Israeli defense system couldn't even protect the city of Eilat from Hezbollah's attacks yesterday, resulting in dozens of Israeli casualties amidst media blackout.

 Scenario of Striking Haifa and Infiltration Through Jordan

Earlier, I predicted that the Port of Haifa would be an Iranian target, evidenced by Hezbollah sending a drone with cameras, not explosives, to film the Port of Haifa and Israeli military bases in northern Israel a day before the Majdal Shams incident. I rule out Iran launching military strikes on Israeli nuclear facilities due to the fear that Israel might reciprocate with the same response, especially as Iran tries to exploit international sympathy towards the strikes it receives to divert attention from its nuclear program, which Netanyahu primarily targets for destruction. Also, I rule out any Iranian intentions to target Israeli gas fields like the Kadish Field, despite Hezbollah recently filming it, because Iran wants to avoid Israeli retaliation against Iranian energy sources or civilians in Lebanon, potentially leading to a nuclear confrontation or open war, a scenario Iran and America want to avoid regardless of Netanyahu's scorched earth policy.

Another scenario emerges from the Jordanian Foreign Minister's visit to Iran, not as a mediator between Israel and Iran but to convey a message from King Abdullah to Khamenei and Bzekian that Jordan is not a passage for armed infiltrators from Iran and its affiliates towards occupied Palestinian territories to respond to Israel and that Jordan is not a party in the current Israeli-Iranian conflict.

In conclusion, the anticipated Iranian strikes on Israel will likely involve drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. Reports suggest an intensified use of cruise missiles in this strike due to their high accuracy and difficulty for the air defense system to intercept, despite being slower and having a shorter range than ballistic missiles. From my perspective, this reflects Iran's vision for the upcoming strike on Israel: limited but impactful, targeting mostly military sites without leading to an open war with Israel, while achieving Iran's goal of avenging its military dignity, reassuring its domestic audience, and restoring the regime's prestige before its militias and followers in the region.